Pathways to Peace, with guest Dan Smith

 Dan Smith is the director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.  With several years' experience with NGOs and international organizations he has written extensively on conflict and insecurity, and I encourage you to read his blog articles at dansmithsblog.com.  

Human Rights Magazine is produced by The Upstream Journal magazine. The host, Derek MacCuish, is editor of both. If you agree that informed reporting on human rights and social justice issues is important, your support would be welcome. Please rate the podcast wherever you listen to it, and tell your friends about episodes that you find interesting. Why not consider making a financial contribution to help us cover costs?  You are always welcome to email with your comments.

Transcript

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Derek MacCuish:

My guest in this episode is Dan Smith, the Director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.  He has written extensively on conflict and insecurity, and I encourage you to read his blog articles at dansmithsblog.com.  To begin our conversation, I asked him, what are the main factors in conflict and insecurity?

Dan Smith:

One of the basic guidelines, one of the basic things to remember if one is trying to understand armed conflicts around the world, of which we reckon there were forty-six during 2021, which is slightly fewer than the previous year, but it's almost double what there was in 2010. If you're trying to understand those conflicts, to some degree you need to understand them one by one, you need to understand them in their context, because each conflict. Indeed, each conflict, before it turns violent, is in its own way unique. And the reasons why it turns violent, why it cannot be handled in a peaceful way, like most conflicts between people are, those reasons are also specific to the context. 

And that's why sometimes historians will feel that political scientists are really messing up the understanding of the world, because political scientists want to draw generalizations. And historians want to go very deep into the specifics. Now, I guess I sit somewhere between the two. 

I think that there are some interesting similarities and parallels that you can see between many armed conflicts. Even though I also agree that in thinking understanding a particular conflict, and especially and understanding what to do about it, you have to be very context specific. Now, before we go into that, I'll make a link to another level, which is to the global level. 

So what is the relationship, let's say, between armed conflict and Ethiopia, which is just the third round of the war in Ethiopia, with a degree and People's Liberation Front has arrived at a ceasefire. What's the link between that, and let's say, the war in Ukraine. So both wars have got completely their own causes. So there is no causal relationship between them. But the war in Ukraine is an explosive point in a process that has been unfolding, very sadly, in global geopolitics over the last decade, in which the capacity to be working together at the global level, to manage regional and local armed conflicts and prevent the worst from happening at a more local level. That capacity has been diminishing. 

If you think about it now, I mean, one of the casualties of the war between Russia and Ukraine is, to some degree, the future of international cooperation, and we will feel that over climate change, we will feel that over hunger, and we will feel that over conflict. I will probably feel it over other things as well, such as health. But those three issues that I mentioned, first climate change, hunger and conflict are also causally interrelated. If you can't handle climate change, if we as humanity cannot handle climate change, then the security horizon in the future looks quite dark, partly because unfettered climate change will feed hunger worldwide, as it has already been doing for the past several years. And that will feed conflict, and violent conflict. And violent conflict itself is a major driving force of, of hunger worldwide. 

So these different phenomena kind of link together in a loop, of potentially an infinite loop. And what you need is concerted cooperative international action to break into that loop so that conflicts are managed hunger is a swatch climate change is mitigated and the consequences of climate change can be adapted to. And it's that concerted action and cooperation which is put at risk by what has been happening in global geopolitics. So if that's not getting all too complex, you have conflicts at national level, regional level or in community is, which are harder to handle because of the deterioration of international politics. And the driving forces of those local conflicts also need to be addressed by international politics. And that hasn't been happening so effectively as it should be for the last few years. 

Derek MacCuish:

When we consider international politics and the dynamics that you’ve just explained, we’re largely talking about political leadership, and there is a strong argument that political leadership has been failing us in recent years, if not more. There are other actors working internationally. Civil society, working more or less cooperatively on things like environmental issues, and there are also corporate powers, the business world. If the political world is failing us, is there any hope that the other dynamics internationally can push us in a more appropriate direction?

Dan Smith:

I think you're right that there's a failure of political leadership, that's at the highest level to be addressing these issues. But there is another factor in there as well, which is the question of the international institutions, like the United Nations, or the European Union, the African Union, and so on. And there are there are many, many of these with different purposes and very different degrees of kind of, I suppose you could say health or effectiveness. 

Now, the one that I think is especially important when we're discussing this topic, or the ones are probably the United Nations and the African Union in particular, and the United Nations is being protected as an institution, and by I think, quite strong and effective leadership within that institution. So despite the fact that the UN is an organization of member states, and there's the Security Council in which there's the veto rights for the five permanent members that include the three great powers, and the 2x, great colonial powers. The UN itself is able to act, first of all, because there's agencies like the World Food Program, or the United Nations High Commissioner, for refugees, that are able to do things, in practical terms to aid people and that very much work on the ground in some of the really on the front lines. But also, it has a secretariat, and it has a headquarters in New York, and they also do a lot of good work, partly then they're able to do that work on issues which are below the highest position on the great powers agendas. 

So if you can work a little bit under the radar, you can get stuff done. And partly, I mean, I think that the role of UN Secretary General Gutierrez in recent years, calling attention to human rights abuse to what he called at one point the pandemic as the epidemic of coup d’état, calling attention to vaccine nationalism and the destructive effect that it was having, calling attention to the impact of climate change, all of these things, I think he has managed to be a strong voice that has given some credibility to the UN and has put some pressure on to the great powers. 

I mean, despite that global geopolitics has deteriorated I think that, without the UN, it would have deteriorated faster and further. So yeah, then the other actors that you mentioned, they are important and more, more is needed all the time, in a way from, from civil society, from activism, and from political movements, to you know, to, for democracy, for human rights for, for managing conflicts peacefully. And the private sector has a big role to play, which it sometimes, I think, itself doesn't understand. Corporate actors think of their responsibility to their shareholders, first and foremost, but they are actually important actors in global society. Some corporate actors get that, some don't. Some kind of get it, yes, no, you know, they kind of walk on both sides of the street at the same time, it's obviously difficult for them. 

I think that the other thing to think about and I think this perhaps, because, you know, I live in work now in Sweden, which is a kind of very much a small to medium power, is that also what is required, I think, is that the other powers the other governments step up more, and themselves put more pressure on to the great powers and onto their assumption of power. I think that the African Union and the European Union are both essentially great forces for good in some ways to moderate the tensions and the position and privilege of the great powers.

Derek MacCuish:

You’ve mentioned climate change a couple of times, and have written and spoken about it. One of the arguments that’s put forward is that when different parties have a common cause they are less likely to get in conflict with each other.  It doesn’t seem that climate change as a global issue has really brought nations together in terms of cooperating terribly effectively on the issue especially given the significant impacts we’ve seen, especially in the last couple of years.  Can you talk about climate change, where it connects with conflict and security, and what are the possibilities for global cooperation?

Dan Smith:

Well, the Climate Summit Conference of Parties, it's called COP, and it was number 26. So at COP 26, last year, in Glasgow, the US and China issued a joint statement saying that they were going to cooperate to mitigate the greenhouse gas emissions, and help countries to adapt to the impact of climate change that was was unavoidable. And it was very clear that they were doing this despite increasing tensions over over Taiwan. And despite the fact that even under Biden the, you know, the high tariffs, which were part of the trade war between the US that was initiated, while Trump was in power in the US, despite the fact that those high tariffs continued. So that was an example of trying to protect international cooperation on a paramount issue from the effects of poor relations between the states on other issues. 

Now, this year, the tension around Taiwan has increased even further. And US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan, and around all of that China announced the end of, or the suspension of, cooperation with the US on climate issues. To me, that's a little bit paradoxical that they did that because they were the ones who had said that climate change cooperation was one thing, and general political relations and security issues where another and one thing could go bad. And the other thing could go well, and you know that that would that would be fine. In other words, they seemed to have a very strong argument in favor of being able to protect climate change action from in problems of insecurity and sour relations. 

So within that relationship, you see, the kind of the two sides of what you're saying, you know, actually cooperation was possible, despite bad relations. But now bad relations have got to a point where they're no longer possible. So we need some active diplomacy, we need some imaginative initiatives, we don't necessarily need any kind of concessions over Taiwan, maybe hopefully, just little bit of calming down there. And then we can get the climate change cooperation back together. 

What I think is a much harder prospect, and I'm much more worried about, is including Russia in climate cooperation. Partly because in Russia there's always been more irrational amongst rational authorities, there's always been more skepticism and reservation about actually getting engaged in all of this. And Putin has been heard to say in the past that, you know, in Siberia, the effects of global warming could be quite good. There are many reasons for questioning that judgment, but one understands what he's getting at. 

But now, I think the depths that the relationships have fallen to, is so serious, that one wonders whether there will really be or how there can really be any significant cooperation, on issues, even paramount issues of clear, common and mutual interest. I would wonder about how it might be possible to include Russia in the next, you know, in responding, prevention and response in the face of the next pandemic, I wonder about it in relation to climate change, I would wonder about it in relation to, even to terrorist threats that might affect Russia just as badly as anybody else, or criminal networks and so areas in which there has been plentiful cooperation over the last two decades, even as other areas of relationship have gotten worse. I think, you know, with Ukraine, it may have in many eyes in the West may have passed a point beyond which cooperation is not really tolerable. And I really regret that and they worry about what the consequences will be.

Derek MacCuish:

Since you’re mentioning Russia, I don’t really want to talk very much about the situation in the Ukraine, but in terms of war and conflict generally, how is it that nations seem unable to learn that war is actually quite ghastly, that the rules of war, as they’ve been set up, are easily set aside, and the effects of people generally are much more than those on soldiers, those actually engaged in the armed conflict, how is it that we, as a society, haven’t learned the terrible cost of war?

Dan Smith:

Yeah, I didn't know. Answers on a postcard, please. There's several things here. And I mean, one of them is insisting on looking at relationships, especially international relationships as zero sum. If you're benefiting, I'm not. So you know, therefore, my benefit is to put you down and as long as we think of relationships in that sort of essentially competitive kind of a way, zero sum rather than win-win, then we were going to be in trouble over this, and I think that most of the time, it doesn't look as bad as a Russian invasion of Ukraine. But you can see the same kind of mentality in a lot of aspects of different states, not just the great powers, by any means different states relationships with each other. 

I think the second thing is this, connected to it, is the kind of concern that, well, I may be a cooperative and lovable person who only wants to get along with you in a win-win kind of way. But I'm afraid that's a gun you've got in your pocket. So I'm gonna get a bigger gun, just to be on the safe side, purely defensive, I assure you, you know, absolutely, except that, then you're gonna get a bigger gun, and so on. So this kind of fear that the other one will get away with something here is a great feeder of military budgets. 

And military spending, even before the war in Ukraine, military spending had topped 2 trillion US dollars in 2021. And that's the highest that it has ever been. So it's not the highest in terms of as a proportion of our gross wealth. But just as a figure, we are spending more now on the military, the world is spending more on the military than we ever have. 

I think that the third element, which I would point to is, in a sense, it's not so much to do with the horror of war. Certainly in Britain, and the degree in the USA, possibly Canada and Australia (you can, others can, tell me better) we have a narrative of war which is,  usually our wars start badly, and then they go through a difficult period, and we come out well at the end. So we get a happy ending. But actually in war, it's not just that war is destructive of humans and of buildings and of life. But war is also actually quite self-destructive. 

I mean, launching a war does not seem to be a terribly good idea. And yet, somehow that temptation is strong. Putin and his circle really thought they were going to get away with it in Ukraine, they could do this, and that it would work for them. And now, they and Putin's leadership and Putin’s standing, Russia’s standing in the world all sorts of things that they care about, are suffering very badly. Along with the fact that thousands of Russians, tens of thousands of Russian soldiers have been killed, as well as tens of thousands of Ukrainians, about which that Russian leadership cares much less. 

I don't see that the history of warfare actually supports the hypothesis that going to war is a good idea. I think it supports the hypothesis that you generally don't get what you want, you get something else. Victory gives the victor something that they didn't expect, maybe didn't want. Maybe it gives them for example, a super powerful ally. I mean, Britain, was on the victorious side of the in the Second World War and came out much weaker than that had gone in. And that's one of the paradoxes of the British trying to understand our own history. And that that's not unusual, that there's that. There's that kind of self-destructive effect like that about Russia. 

There's now there's a considerable body of thought that it's quite possible that, whatever happens in the War, Russia comes out as the weaker side in a relationship with China, that it has traded whatever it thought the price of Ukraine's independence was, by trying to destroy that. What it has got is a dependent relationship upon China. And if that turns out to be true, that will simply be confirmation, you know, going to war is not a very good idea. Why don't you all just stop it? And then if everybody were to agree that going to war is not a very good idea. Perhaps we'd be able to say, okay, so then we can genuinely bring the number of weapons down.

I just gave you one statistic, the world military spending has gone over $2 trillion in 2021. At the end of the Cold War in 1990 it was 1.5 trillion US dollars in today's dollars. So, accounting for inflation, by the late 1990s it was just above 1 trillion US dollars. So there was a 1/3 reduction in global military spending during the 1990s. Since then, it has more or less doubled to today's total. So if we focus on the last two decades, we think oh my god, this is horrible, this is awful, you know. But if we think about the 1990s, as well, we can see that, in the right circumstances, it's possible to reduce the military burden upon economies, on society, and make progress.

Derek MacCuish:

Is there anything in general you’d like to say as we wrap up, as we’re at the end of the time we gave ourselves?

Dan Smith:

Well, I was I was recently asked, last week in fact, I was on a program on Polish radio, because I'm at a conference in Poland. I was asked the question, is there anything that makes you optimistic? So I’ll finish by more or less repeating the answer that I gave. And what I said was that I've been engaged in studies and activity in this field of peace and security for an embarrassingly long time. I graduated from university in 1973, which I'm horrified to find is almost fifty years ago, and went straight into working in this field. And first of all, I couldn't have stayed this long unless I was a person with a generally cheery and optimistic disposition. Secondly, I've seen things get better. And I've seen things get worse. And I've seen things get better again and then worse again, and we are now in a period of a downturn. But the expansion of the kind of zone of peace in the world, from 1990 until about 2008 was real. There were fifty armed conflicts in 1990. And there were only about thirty in 2008, 2009. Now the number has increased again, but that means that we can do it, it can be done. 

Now, what has changed in during the period in the last twelve to fourteen years? One is that there was an economic crisis, which I think through the world off balance in a much bigger way than we have understood. And the other thing is the intense competition. It's the question of political leadership that we were talking about at the beginning of this podcast. So yes, the challenges are very great, but we have confronted similar challenges in the past and come through them okay. And if we can come can come through them with a kind of a longer perspective, and I would say a greater sense of realism about where our prosperity and our happiness lies. Then my fifty years of cheerful disposition will be turned out to be well justified in the end.