Corruption in Brazil - what’s changed?

Across the world, corruption costs trillions of dollars that should have gone into social and environmental progress. Corruption steals from efforts to reduce poverty, to improve social services and to build schools, hospitals and roads. It leaves little room for democracy and systems of justice.

In this episode of Human Rights Magazine, Sofia Gobin explores the concern with corruption in Brazil.

Human Rights Magazine is produced by The Upstream Journal magazine. The host, Derek MacCuish, is editor of both. If you agree that informed reporting on human rights and social justice issues is important, your support would be welcome. Please rate the podcast wherever you listen to it, and tell your friends about episodes that you find interesting. Why not consider making a financial contribution to help us cover costs?  You are always welcome to email with your comments.

Transcript

Intro (Derek MacCuish):

Across the world, corruption costs trillions of dollars that should have gone into social and environmental progress. Corruption steals from efforts to reduce poverty, to improve social services and to build schools, hospitals and roads. It leaves little room for democracy and systems of justice.

In this episode of Human Rights Magazine, Sofia Gobin explores the concern with corruption in Brazil.

Sofia Gobin: 

Welcome to today's episode of "Human Rights Magazine". My name is Sofia Gobin, and in this episode, we’ll be diving into an ongoing systemic issue that continues to challenge Brazilian society: corruption. Corruption in Brazil has deep historical roots, dating back to the colonial era when exploitation and favouritism were pervasive. Over the centuries, corruption has become entrenched in various sectors, from politics to business. Notable scandals such as the Petrobras Operation “Lava Jato”, which translates to “Car Wash” scandal in 2014, which exposed a vast network of corruption involving top politicians and major corporations, have underscored the systemic nature of the problem. These scandals have not only shaken public trust but also highlighted the significant human rights implications, as resources meant for public welfare are siphoned off, exacerbating social inequalities and undermining the rule of law. 

I’ve interviewed a lineup of knowledgeable guests who have dedicated their careers to exposing, studying, and combating corruption in Brazil. Our experts include Gregory Michener,  an Associate Professor at FGV/EBAPE and the founder of the Brazil Open Data Initiative, whose research and policy on transparency and accountability has been pivotal in advocating open data practices and policy changes in Brazil. 

Secondly, we have Fernanda Odilla, an award-winning investigative journalist and research fellow at the University of Bologna, studying the development and implementation of tools and technology used uncover and monitor corrupt behaviour. Recently, Odilla has shifted her attention to Europe, examining forms of influence that, while not always illegal, can still lead to corrupt practices. 

Finally, Juliana Sakai is the Operations Director at Transparencia Brazil, an NGO who has been leading impactful anti-corruption initiatives. Sakai's role involves not only managing and coordinating anti-corruption projects but also strategizing ways to influence policy and public opinion. Her work focuses on exposing corrupt practices, supporting legislative reforms, and strengthening civil society’s role in holding officials accountable. 

Together, in our discussions with these experts, we’ll hear expert opinions on the current state of corruption in Brazil and the possibilities and options to use moving forward. 

The Lava Jato (Car Wash) investigation, once a beacon of hope for anti-corruption efforts, has seen significant setbacks in recent years. I asked our interviewees about how they perceive corruption in Brazil, and how it has changed over the past ten years, especially since operation Lava Jato.

Our first speaker, Gregory Michener, coming from a policy and freedom of information background, is concerned about the legislative and judicial changes that have further complicated anti-corruption efforts. 

Gregory Michener: So, things have gotten very retrograde, uh, since Lava Jato. It's been, uh, I would say two, you know, two steps forward, two and a half steps back since, uh, I arrived here, I arrived here in 2009, and I witnessed and participated in and helped with certain, the passage of certain laws, because my specialty is on freedom of information and transparency policies. And so I, I participated in events leading to the passage of the freedom of information law, what we call a "legislaciao para informaciao publica" here, right? Then they had all kinds of laws passed, including a conflict of interest law in 2013. Also, the anti-corruption law in [00:01:00] 2013, and then a, a law on criminal organization, essentially racketeering law in 2013. Those, the two last laws that I'm talking about from 2013, which are the numbers are 12.846, and 12.850 I believe. Those laws were instrumental in creating the momentum for the Lava Jato because they essentially empowered, uh, government agents, the federal police, and prosecutors to use plea bargains in the first time in history, really effectively in Brazil.

Gregory Michener explains that plea bargains were crucial because they empowered prosecutors to get confessions and information from accused individuals, who would then implicate others in exchange for reduced sentences. This created a snowballing effect, exposing widespread corruption among Brazil's political elite. 

He also highlighted a Supreme Court decision that reinforced this leverage by mandating jail time for those convicted of white-collar crimes after an appeal, allowing many to avoid prison through legal mechanisms like habeas corpus. 

Gregory Michener: Um, again, meaning that, so if you were convicted of corruption, uh, after an appeal, you didn't have to necessarily go to jail. And most white collar criminals would not go to jail. They'd get out on what's called the habeas corpus. Which is a writ that lawyers can provide saying, I want him out of jail because there's no necessary, he's not a risk of flight, et cetera, et cetera. [00:03:00] And so, um, combined with the, you're going to jail and the plea bargaining power, the Lava Jato had very strong leverage to get, you know criminal indictments because people were essentially tattletaling on each other they essentially so name five people who were involved in corruption and detail their crimes and so it was a sort of snowballing thing where you had hundreds of politicians and basically the entire political elite in one way or the other with allegations of corruption (some more credible than others). 

Gregory Michener: I mean, they, [00:04:00] uh, after the impeachment of Jilma, uh, Congress gained a lot more power in general, uh, with that. The conservative factions gained more power because they were the conservative, sort of the right that brought down Dilma and the PT, and the right became very empowered. And Bolsonaro, although he promised to cut down on corruption, he came in in 2018 essentially on an anti corruption and anti workers party platform. But he failed to put that into action because his family started to become investigated by the federal police. And in order to save his family, he effectively, uh, sacrificed the Minister of Justice, who was, of course, the Judge Sergio Moros, the famous, um, you know, sort of crusading judge who was in the front of the Lava Jato, that, [00:05:00] the sort of protagonist, one of the protagonists of the Lava Jato.

And in sacrificing him from the Minister of Justice, the whole Lava Jato and everything started to unravel, um, as well as the fact that Bolsonaro was completely reliant on his continued survival on Congress. So in exchange for, essentially Congress not impeaching him, Congress could do whatever it wanted, and what it did was it rolled back a lot of the laws that had been passed, um, or even just laws that were in existence, and it passed some other laws like the abusive authority law, which basically makes it much more difficult for prosecutors and the federal police to investigate corruption in Brazil. It weakened the administrative property law, also making it very difficult to accuse someone of corruption, um, falsely and essentially just You know, rolled the clock back. And then [00:06:00] when the Supreme Court made this decision to revert the jail after a guilty appeal, guilty decision on appeal, that essentially the whole thing fell apart and Lula's is in many ways in the same position as Bolsonaro, he doesn't have a majority in Congress, which means that his, the approval of things in Congress is contingent upon lawmakers in Congress agreeing to support him in Congress. He doesn't have a majority. Um, and basically what they are asking for, what they've always asked for is essentially, we want pieces of your government. 

Justice Toffoli’s recent decision to annul key Lava Jato evidence was a highly important update in the Lava Jato case. This ruling and its implications for high-profile corruption cases in Brazil?

Gregory Michener: And then of course, Probably the most important event that's happened in the last several months is that this Justice Toffoli, which you probably read about in the Financial Times or any other newspaper, The Economist, there's a Justice, um, Antonio Toffoli, who has, uh, in September of 2023, he annulled evidence of all the lava, essentially all the Aldebrecht, uh, evidence, which essentially is sort of the bedrock [00:09:00] case for the Lava Jato. And then he annulled the case basically altogether, um, in over the last month. And he's freed, uh, several prisoners who, for instance, Marcelo Aldebrecht, who was in prison for supposed to be serving 17 years, And he's now out. Um, and so, you know, this, this didn't start just because of Toffoli. I mean, I believe that, you know, Lula during Lula, it's absolutely crystal clear. The evidence is incontrovertible that a giant, uh, corruption system was operating in the national petroleum company. And, you know, governors also were involved, like our governor here, Sergio Cabral, who was sentenced to almost 400 years in prison. And Sergio Cabral, as soon as Lula was elected, [00:10:00] um, was essentially, you know, as soon as Lula was elected, no, it was actually in the semifinals week of the, I think the finals of the world cup, just before Argentina won the world cup, that he was released from prison on effectively very dubious, um, grounds. And, you know, he was a strong ally of Lula's as well. So, I mean, I'm not saying that Lula is necessarily, you know, the headmaster of this corruption, but there's no question that during his governments, right, 2006, he was involved in the Menzalol scandal at the highest levels of government. I mean, his chief of staff, um, what you call Caza CVO, you probably know. Was in was had to resign because of that scandal. Um, and several people were in prison. More than 30 people were in prison. I wrote an article on that scandal with Carlos banana. It was published in [00:11:00] 2016 in the Journal of Latin American studies on the men's hollow. Um, but that was the first scandal, and that was essentially a vote buying, uh, scandal where he was systematic, where the president, where the Workers Party was systematically buying votes in Congress. And effectively, the Petrobras scandal was the same thing, whereby parties aligned with the PT were in on getting inflated, getting kickbacks from inflated contracts in Petrobras in exchange for their votes in Congress. 

So, I mean, coalition politics in Brazil has shown itself to be a source of major corruption. Essentially, you  know, it's a coalition government, meaning that parties, it has a record number of parties in the coalition and a record number of cabinet ministers right now. And they each control pieces of government. They don't want transparency. They certainly don't want any corruption because, [00:07:00] uh, you know, the modus operandi of Brazilian politics is an elite pact for corruption has been for, for decades, if not centuries. And so corruption is really on the back, anti corruption is really on the back foot in the sense that, um, under Lula, I think things are, are getting worse in fact. As well as combined with a sort of chilling effect of freedom of expression in general, because if you say anything bad about Lula, well, then you're considered, you know, in favor of Bolsonaro. It's either this sort of you're with us or against us type mentality. And, um, so, you know, journalists that I know and talk to are feeling a sort of chilling effect of freedom of expression. Um, and, you know, Lula has actually put in place certain institutional intimidation factors, such as a special [00:08:00] section of the attorney general to look into misinformation and, um, you know, false. falsehoods against the government, which I think they've been using also for just reasons of people criticizing the government, even questioning the government now. Um, and so it's, uh, transparency is on the back foot, anti corruption is on the back foot. Things are not good right now in Brazil. It's, uh, it's going backwards. 

Gregory Michener: And there's no, this is sort of, for corruption experts, this is a point of where there's no debate. I mean, these oversized coalitions, the fact that Brazil has the most fragmented party system in the world, meaning it's got the most parties of any country in the world by more than a third, like [00:12:00] Indonesia is second place. I think it has got a third less effective number of parties than Brazil. I mean, these systems are clearly, they don't work, um, for, for providing good government. They work for, uh, you know, making it so that parties will essentially hold the executive branch ransom in order to get their votes. And so that's, that's the situation currently.

I asked Prof. Michener what efforts and reforms he thought needed to be taken moving forward. 

Gregory Michener: Um, well, I think that the Supreme Court needs to be reformed so that, uh, first of all, they stop flip flopping on matters of huge consequence like this, you know, prison after a first appeal essentially. If you're a white collar criminal and you have money, you mean you've stolen enough money, you [00:13:00] effectively will never go to jail because you can run out the clock by buying appeals. You have a total of four appeals, but those appeals can take, you know, 10-30 years, depending. It's really up to the discretion of the Supreme Court because the Supreme Court has what's called a privilege forum, meaning that if you're a deputy, a governor, If you're a senator, if you're the president, if you're a mayor, then you can only be judged criminally by the Supreme Court, which first of all has no criminal competence. It's not a criminal court, right? Which is one strike against it. But the second thing is, is that they can choose not to prosecute. They can choose to just essentially let it go because they've got too much on their docket, right? And they've done that many times, um, it's only when popular opinion gets behind it. But the Supreme Court, the way it functions as a last court of appeal, as well as a constitutional court, is a very silly [00:14:00] design. I mean, in Canada or the U. S. and other countries, it only works as a constitutional court. You don't have the, the court working as a last court of appeal, because there's simply too much to take care of.

I mean, there's hundreds of thousands of cases awaiting the judgment of the Supreme Court as a final court of appeal, and it's just silly. It's especially silly that they're responsible for criminal cases, right? Uh, there should be a specialized criminal case in the, in the, in the, in, in Finland, for, for example. There's a court of impeachment, which is exactly what we should have in Brazil, is a court of impeachment that deals with improbity because when you have improbity, this sets, you know, not only does it tear up society by creating cynicism and distrust of government. It, it, it steals money from citizens. It actually encourages, it's shown to encourage crime in general. It's called the broken window effect. You can look it up on [00:15:00] Wikipedia. It's um, essentially when, when there's broken windows in your neighborhood, people are more likely to break windows. It's the same with crime. If, if you're elite are creating and you know and are providing the example of crime, you're gonna have more crime, which is exactly what's happened in Brazil.

You've got this impunity. And now you've got PCC, which is the Primeiro Comando do Capital, the giant criminal organized gang that's now in 20, over 20 countries, right? They've expanded so much, and this is not a coincidence. This is because you've got essentially An elite that doesn't punish corruption. And so it's expanded to criminal organizations as well. And so, you know, the Supreme Court and the whole criminal justice system, white collar criminal justice system needs to be reformed drastically. I mean, this is the first thing that needs to happen. So, um, in terms of, you [00:16:00] know, I don't think transparency is as important as, um, I mean, it's certainly very important, but they're the priorities are really reforming the political system. I mean, I personally think that the coalition presidential system of Brazil is a is a fountainhead of corruption.

But in terms of transparency. So one paper that we're presenting now, I think, seven days from now at the University of Pennsylvania, which compares the corruption prosecutions, Um, so what happens is a lot of the companies that were involved in the Lava Jato prosecutions, they were prosecuted in the U. S. and in Brazil. Why? Because they're traded on the U. S. Stock Exchange. And because they're traded on the U. S. Stock Exchange, they're subject to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of the U. S., and they're prosecuted by the Department of Justice and the SEC in the U. S. And so they were prosecuted in the U. S., companies like [00:17:00] Braskem and Foster Wheeler and Petrobras, they were prosecuted in the U. S. and also in Brazil. So what we did is one of my students, most of my students are federal public servants. This guy was working in the anti corruption unit in the office of the Comptroller General, the CGU, if you know of it, in Brazil.

And he noticed that, you know, the prosecutions that happened in the U. S. and that happened in Brazil. So he said, well, look, for my master's thesis, I want to compare the transparency of what the Brazilian government is showing the public about these corruption cases and what the Americans are seeing in terms of transparency. So we compared them and what we found is almost no transparency in Brazil. I mean, there's no public registry of the crimes that occurred, right? If you leave that to the press and you leave that to press releases from government agencies, you're going to get a very distorted picture, because who knows what the truth is, right?

The [00:18:00] truth should be official documents. That's why we have, you know, the access to information law in Canada, or we have got the Freedom of Information Act in the United States. And that's why we have a legislation here in Brazil. But the fact is, is that Brazil provides almost no information on corruption prosecutions, the sort of what, where, why, what, et cetera, how of the corruption story.

Which it deserves to provide a public accounting because that's public money that's been stolen and it was public resources that prosecuted the wrongdoers, right? And so the public deserves an accounting and. So that transparency, I think, would go a long way in preventing the sort of annulments that we've seen, I mean, from Toffoli. I doubt that he would have been able to get away with those annulments as easily had there been a very good public record of what had occurred. Because I think there's a certain collective amnesia here, and there's a certain lack of wanting to put in the effort to go back to those articles, to [00:19:00] go to the books, and actually figure out well, you know, just hopefully actually is he right here? 

Professor Odilla, our second interviewee, highlights the diminishing efforts of Brazil's accountability systems post-Lava Jato, with less action from prosecutors and new laws that seem to only protect politicians, which makes it hard to understand the full extent of ongoing corruption. 

Fernanda Odilla: 

(01:00) Hard to tell, right? Because corruption is kind of a hidden activity that we don't, we don't know much unless we do have people reporting it, people investigating it. But what we can say for sure is that with such things, 10 years after the task force that was engaged in the car wash was dismantled. So we see that the prosecution service is not that engaged in investigating corruption. More broadly speaking, not only cases related to Lava Jato, the key figures, involved in the, in the investigation, from the prosecution and the judiciary side, they tried to, um, their careers as politicians. And the prosecutor was elected, but then he was impeached, the Lieutenant Delanyol, and Judge Moro, became minister of, the Bolsonaro government, and he was, he tried to run for president, but then he gave up in the middle of the way, and then he was elected a senator. And this week is going to be, I think, crucial for him because he can, lose his mandate.

So what we've been seeing actually is a backlash in many ways, possible. So we do have more administratively speaking, the prosecution service kind of dismantling the thing. The political elite, reacting to those who were investigated and became politicians. And I'm not saying there are no reasons or grounds for kind of Punishing them because they also made mistakes, but also we've been seeing a lot of backlashes regarding the legislation, achievements that we had in the past year. So the political class, mainly, members of the lower house and the Senate, they've been passing a lot of legislation. show kind of protect themselves, and also, they passed, an abuse of power legislation to try to kind of I don't know if men, if they work, but to try to contain abuses from the law enforcers. So I think right now the current status is, it seems that the accountability system, especially the top-down one, is weaker than it was before. And this raises concern about what's going on with the corruption that I'm pretty sure is still happening, but I cannot tell you exactly what is going on because with no investigation, it's hard to say, right?

Dr. Odilla also shared her insights on how recent actions by both Former President Bolsonaro and Current President Lula have raised concerns about the independence of these crucial institutions, particularly the prosecution service and the Supreme Court. She highlighted that under Lula's earlier presidency, there was a practice of appointing the head of the prosecution service based on a list voted on by prosecutors, which Bolsonaro discontinued and Lula has not revived in his current term. 

Fernanda Odilla: So it's a kind of a sign that he's appointing someone who looks like, that could be making his life easier as we had, during the Bolsonaro's term, the head of the prosecutor service. He was kind of quite docile and he wasn't creating any issues for the government in terms of creating investigations. Another thing that we saw is that Lula has been appointing, to dissent, no,  to the Supreme Court people who are very close to him, uh, like his personal lawyer and then the Minister of Justice. So he's appointing friends to the Supreme Court  and to me, Bolsonaro did the same, uh, and to me is a clear sign [00:05:00] that they want to protect themselves. because it's the Supreme Court that takes action against the president in Brazil. So we see kind of, uh, uh, all the law enforcement main actors kind of control, um, and to me this is a way, kind of political, they are trying to survive politically because Lula in the past had many issues with the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor's Service, But it still to me is a problem because we are, uh, weakening the institutions, right? The independence of the institutions. So, um, I'm, I'm pessimist in this, in this regard. 

As a recurring pattern in Brazilian politics, corruption seems to be a constant concern in the lives of Brazilian citizens. Fernanda explains that while petty corruption, like paying bribes for everyday services, persists and is perceived to some extent, the focus and major problem lies in grand corruption.

Fernanda Odilla:  So if you look at the polls, people don't, ordinary people, they don't report experience with corruption as much as they perceive top [00:07:00] level corruption as a main widespread issue in Brazil. So we have this kind of discrepancy of thinking Brazil is super corrupt, but not experiencing it in your daily activities. So I don't, I don't see that as normal on the daily basis for ordinary citizens. But, when they talk about grand corruption to get contracts, to, um, be appointed and then, um, to get [00:08:00] access to politicians, to, um, so we do have this practices that they are not Entirely legal, like, I don't know, campaign financing, um, lobbying, revolving doors. Sometimes they're not even regulated. Lobbying in Brazil is still not regulated, but they can be corrupted practices. And I think in Brazil, they're, very likely to be used to get benefits, on the expense of the collective, I would say. 

So, I think there is, yes, this kind of feeling that there is , in Portuguese we say, “ele rouba, mas faz”. So, he steals, but gets things done. That cou ld be a sign of what you're saying. Um, or all politicians are the same. There is this feeling, but again, regarding the [00:09:00] politicians, not necessarily the entire country, you know? Um, so, but it's still, it's hard to tell. After the car wash, one of the first measures taken still back in 2014, um, was forbidden, companies to, uh, finance parties and campaigns. So now, what we have is a kind of public funding. We didn't have it before in the volume we have now, and individuals can still donate, but up to a certain percentage of their revenue in the past year. And, It was an attempt to reduce corruption related to campaign donations, but who can guarantee that there are not off the record kind of contributions or any way to circumvent the legislation. So I think Brazil still faces issues regarding grand corruption, [00:10:00] more than petty corruption in short. But. Again, um, it's not just a problem of Brazil, right? 

I asked Prof. Odilla what she believed to be the next steps in terms of transparency and accountability moving forward.

Fernanda Odilla: 

If you look at Brazil, Brazil is playing by the book. So I think it's one of the, at the federal level, one of the most transparent countries I've ever seen in terms is very easy to get access to, um, campaign donations. Now in, regarding individuals and before regarding companies and expenditures, for example, um, we do have, e-agenda, so you can, access all the meetings that, politicians had, sometimes [00:11:00] explaining to details the goal of the meeting. So it's everything open, public, searchable. We do have, uh, for a long time now, um, All the salaries from the president to the cleaner public available monthly available. We do have, um, we do have a lot of information. So transparency is not necessarily, uh, an issue. Uh, on the federal level regarding the federal executive, but then the Senate, the lower chamber, the judiciary is still more complicated, but, but it's still going on the same way. Um, what I think the thing is civil society is not that strong as we would like to. So I think we need pressure. I, I'm convinced that, politicians in Brazil, they are reactive. [00:12:00] So under pressure, they take certain actions. And if they perceive that their reelection are not in risk, they, they don't, they don't do much. So we need more kind of a social oversight. I would say social accountability is one thing that we need and better mechanisms to avoid backlashes. And this is tricky in terms of legislation. I mean, this is tricky because, uh, of course if we see legislation very kind of rigid, we don't improve them. But on the other hand, if you're, they're very flexible, you can kind of change them according to the political mood. And this is something that we've been seeing. So especially regarding accountability, we should have more kind of control on the regulations and the legislation we've been seeing. But, uh, in the end, We need to vote for better [00:13:00] politicians, I think, because, and control them, it's not just a matter of voting and that's fine, it's kind of monitoring them, uh, asking, complaining, um, over signing them, it's, I don't know, uh, sometimes I think we should be better citizens. To have better politicians and because, man, if you wait for them to do the work, they are not doing it and it's kind of clear that cannot expect much from them. This is a shame, but this is the reality. 

Odilla notes that although there were strong transparency movements in the late 1990s and early 2000s, their influence has diminished, especially under Bolsonaro's government and during the Covid-19 pandemic. 

Fernanda Odilla: I don't know if this political scenario impacts on that. But what we saw amid this, there's a lot of things that was happening. It was the new right appropriated of the discourse of anti corruption. So anti [00:17:00] corruption was polarized. Uh, new groups started, um, acting, but they do use social media to spread news, sometimes fake news.

And, in the past, they organized demonstrations, but we don't. So it was basically raising public awareness and saying politicians are corrupt, especially the Workers Party one. Those groups who are more engaged in doing social accountability, kind of civic things tech action, things that are more productive in many ways. They kind of, uh, they keep doing their things, but they have issues should be used. 

The anti-corruption discourse became polarized, with new right-wing groups using social media to spread their agenda, often with misinformation. This has begun to damage the effectiveness of civil society as well.

Fernanda Odilla: So these people who've been kind of doing social control and social monitoring without, claiming they are right or left, they didn't want to get closer to this new group that emerged. So they stopped saying they were, uh, fighting corruption and they, they started saying, no, we are doing civic monitoring. We're promoting transparency. They, they try to reframe themselves. To avoid the political polarization and to me, this is a very interesting thing. They keep fighting corruption, but the way they presented themselves, especially in Bolsonaro's government. Now, I think they kind of are trying to get traction again, but it's still very, it's very slow. 

Fernanda Odilla: Well, I think they don't, they, they wanted to escape the polarization, the political polarization and not being seen as one of the sides of the spectrum. Um, and it's true because corruption is not, uh, a right wing thing or a left wing thing. It's. Corruption, especially in Brazil, prevails all the spectrum. We have issues, uh, we've been having issues with all sort of politicians and, and I think it was a, a survival strategy to kind of keep doing what they do, uh, without being recognized as someone from one side or the other, I think. Absolutely.  

Fernanda Odilla notes that in 2018, Bolsonaro and others used anti-corruption to win elections, but once in power, they faced their own scandals. By 2022, corruption was no longer a major issue, highlighting how anti-corruption is more an electoral tool than a true priority. I asked Fernanda Odilla about her thoughts on the potential effects of corruption and democratic backsliding over the next decade. Here’s what she had to say.

Fernanda Odilla: 

Man, I think I'm waiting for the new scandal because it's a matter of time. Um, what concerns me the most is the fact that the law enforcement agencies, so the office of the Comptroller General, the Federal Police, the Prosecution Service, the Court of Accounts, the Supreme Court, they are not as independent as we would like. And then this kind of compromises not only democracy, obviously it does, but also the chances that we're going to discover the next scandal because we depend on them. They are the ones with the best tools, unless someone they're comes to public and whistleblower something, denounces something, reports something. It's very unlikely that the biggest [00:28:00] scandals we had in Brazil, these agencies, they were active and in investigation and revealing things. Um, so I fear that even if we have someone blowing the whistle or coming public to reveal something, the reaction would not be the one we would like, kind of investigating, uh, trying to send to trial those who are under suspicious and punishing those proved to be guilty. But it's still, it's kind of hard to say what's going on. I, I, I fear that we are going to, um, believe everything is fine. And another thing I've been thinking a lot is that Brazil is still very divided. The polarization of Bolsonaro is still very strong with a loyal base of supporters who try [00:29:00] to, um, Bolsonaro and his allies to organize a coup d'etat in Brazil. So sometimes I fear that people are being more lenient to Lula now and to his government, fearing that we go back to a dictatorship. So it's not good for democracy as well because we are impacting its quality, but we are stuck in this difficult game in which we don't want to attack someone who looks like more democrat than the other one.

But on the other hand, we are letting things going on without knowing if they're going on in the best way or not. Um, so hard to tell how it's very hard to predict the future. I wish I could. But the only thing I can say is that we, we saw this incremental approach to [00:30:00] accountability in Brazil. So, and it has never been straightforward. We would give two steps ahead, one back, one to the side. But we were evolving and suddenly we saw a backlash in all ways and forms and corruption being used as the main, it was instrumentalized in many ways. And, and then it's not good as well because I want organizations, institutions, civil society fighting corruption, but Fighting with the rule of law with all the guarantees that innocent people are not going to be penalized, but it became a card in the political game. And this is also concerning, right? The wrong use of anti corruption. So I hope we find a way to improve the quality of the [00:31:00] institutions. And another thing that I've, I've been thinking a lot, um, the office of the controller general, it's a very important institution it has ever been since it was created in 2001 and it has been improving over the years, but I saw that they are kind of also, um, reframing themselves.

And they are not, they are not fighting corruption anymore, but they are improving integrity. And I can understand that in the political discourse, if you improve integrity, it's easier to sell this than if you're fighting corruption because then you assume there is corruption to be fought. But, I hope it's for real. It's not just a way to rebrand yourself and, uh, do not improve the mechanisms and, recently we saw one, one newspaper, a Brazilian newspaper called O [00:32:00] Estado Estadão. They published that because the head of this agency, this is the anti corruption agency in the federal level in the executive, he used to be a lawyer.

And he took a leave of absence of his law firm. His girlfriend is still there and he had important clients like Facebook, like an airline, uh, Goal. It's a Brazilian one, the mining company Valley. And, uh, he's been receiving them. To talk about topics that are not very clearly related to the agency. And we keep thinking if the head of the anti corruption agency are is having this kind of meetings that they're open, you can find information about them in this system. There is nothing hidden, but it's still very weird, right? Uh, it's not his role to receive his former clients because this [00:33:00] is important. All these companies uh, our clients of his own law firm that now he's not leading anymore, but his girlfriend is still there. So we see signs here and there that things are not that, uh, towards integrity, but we don't see a lot of public reaction on this.

Our last interviewee is Juliana Sakai, the Operations Officer of Transparency Brazil who shares valuable perspectives into her latest efforts to enhance political party transparency and accountability in Brazil.

Juliana Sakai: Yeah. So, one of the things we're trying to should you right now because we have been working a lot with access to information and monitoring the expenditures to open contracting and so on[00:04:00]. But one new project we have just made is to discuss with the political parties possibilities of improving their ability, their transparency, their integrity, their accountings, their diversity actually. And, their own the democratic system, internal to the parties. This, because we have been fighting a lot. 

We have been like every two years we have elections, either a national or municipal, and every two years we had a new proposal to weaken the controlling system, the financiary system, the accountability system of the parties using public money. To fund themselves and the campaigns as well. And it's always very difficult because this is the point where all the big parties, and with that, I mean, the PL, which is the one that supported Bolsonaro, the ones from Bolsonaro, and the PT, both of them are, will be supporting this kind of resolution, they will unite it. To diminish, to increase the power of the political leaders, to distribute the money that the parties get. So I think that one thing that we were trying to do actually was to use a line of strategy to just, it's very hard to promote, promote confidence in violence. It's very hard to promote, you know, like, even like we have been discussing, we have been defending the quotas for women, for black candidatures as well. And, and they are always attacking this kind of measure. And I think that the, especially on the side of the elections legislature, this is a huge downside for us. 

And so, the strategy was a little bit more like, okay, which are the parties that can actually, that are actually willing to discuss with the people, with civil society and with academia, how they can be better representatives and how they can be more democratic, right? And, it's. It was a little bit frustrating on the one hand because we had a lot of parties and we could mobilize only four parties to join it, to join this, this, it was pretty much based on the on motor stakeholders forms of forums. And so we invited civil society and the parties itself to discuss it. And at the end, we were able to discuss with four of them. We still had a big one, which is in MDA, but the two biggest, PT or PL, they, they, they didn't join. And so at the end, it's like, okay, we tried to mobilize and improve the parties, and their conversations and dialogue with civil society, but pretty much difficult to make systematic improvements.

She suggests that corruption has become a less prominent concern in the eyes of Brazilian citizens.

Juliana Sakai: So, um, I think that as you pointed now after Lava Jato, we had a clear, weakening of a lot of systems of control and in Brazil of to combating corruption. And I think that, um, there is, uh, these on on the side of the of the of the agencies and also on the side of society. This perception that this fight against corruption was a problem and was actually what brought us to the extreme right. So I think [00:01:00] the state of corruption in Brazil is right now that it's not something very sexy to talk about. As not really something that the parties wanted to deal with and actually they take advantage of the situation to decrease the, the, the, the controlling system in general. I would say not only the parties, but, uh, actually there is, um, uh, a lot of um, things going on, uh, not only inside the legislative itself, uh, but also, uh, on the side of the judiciary, uh, where we are, uh, are seeing the, the recurring decisions, um, uh, against the, the Lava Japa itself, right? So, um, right now it's not, it's really not, uh, the. the best time, um, [00:02:00]for, for fighting against corruption. It's right now, not something that people [00:03:00] are talking so much and that there are not, there is no policy really in terms of, of fighting corruption. And you can see this also in. The government and, uh, in the office of the controller General, for example. 

Ms. Sakai discusses how corruption plays into social hierarchy and power dynamics. 

Juliana Sakai: Well, at the end of the day, we, uh, have like an elite that actually can can still use their money in their favor and instead of using in favor of who needs it most, right? Uh, and I think that this is what we are talking about all the time. So, um, we, we are. Like discussing, uh, tributary [00:09:00] reform right now, which actually, uh, quite surprising for Brazil. I mean, in terms of, like, how, um, we were able to, or have been able to in a lot of months to simplify the, the tributary regime.

But when, when it comes to. Um, to see who, who is being privileged, who has access to power, not, you see that there are a lot of exemptions coming out to this, uh, tributary reform, which means that the, the same old groups have sufficient power to promote their, their, their, their own. Um, um. Interest, right? Um, we have so I'm talking to here in corruption, not very broad term, like in terms of who is able to capture the state. But even if you [00:10:00] look at, for example, how the judiciary system in Brazil is able to capture a lot of revenues as well for their own benefit. You know, and, um, uh, and even if we have like, uh, um, a seal, not a seal, you say, uh, a limit to, to the, the, the salaries, they are able to like invent a lot of, uh, manners to circumvent this and increase their, their gains and give a legal appearance to it at, of the, at the end of the day.

Sakai then continued to share her concerns about powerful politicians in Brazil who have gained increased discretion over public spending, often at the expense of funding for positive public benefits. As a result, money that should be allocated based on technical needs is instead distributed based on political favoritism.  

When it comes to the future, Ms. Sakai says she is pessimistic. 

Juliana Sakai: yeah. I don't see, uh, really a movement right now, um, again, that, that could, uh, support the fight against corruption. It's, it's really a very systematic problem here, where You see, you have like the, the, all the movements since 2013, uh, uh, that There was like civil society movement that in which they, they, uh, uh, they point corruption as a huge problem. Civil society point as a huge problem. And then [00:15:00] you have like Dilma, Dilma's impeachment.

Uh, and then you have like Bolsonaro coming to power and then you have Nothing to actually make all the old problems better. Actually, they are worsening. Actually, you have, like, all the, all the, uh, control system getting worse. And, uh, and the decisions that were made to, to destructure the, the, the, the vasajato, the, the lava jato. You see they going, you know, they, they are disappearing the, and so everything has been undone. It's not, it's not getting worsening and you don't have an answer for the same, the, the old problems, you know? So there is, I, I don't see pretty much a, a way out. Uh, Nor [00:16:00] for trust in political institutions, because we were still going to see a lot of corruption problems and scandals and in the coming months.

So it will continue to appear somehow and. And you don't have an answer because the, the, the, the structures to fight against corruption are were dismantled and, and the one is really interesting in in straining right now. Um, except from the public ministry, maybe the federal public ministries is restructuring again right now. But yeah, we, it's, they said themselves, they, they say that. It's being reconstructed. It's being reconstructed right now, everything. 

To wrap up this episode of "Human Rights Magazine," it’s evident that corruption in Brazil remains a deeply rooted issue. My discussions with Gregory Michener, Fernanda Odilla, and Juliana Sakai reveal a grim reality: recent setbacks, such as the dismantling of Lava Jato and weakened oversight, have worsened the problem and eroded public trust.

Michener highlights the complexities introduced by new legislative changes, while Odilla points to evolving forms of corruption that challenge existing tools. Sakai, with her on-the-ground perspective, expresses a strong sense of pessimism about the current anti-corruption efforts. Despite these challenges, the ongoing commitment and passion of these experts and advocates provide me with hope for the future. Their work underscores the importance of vigilance and resilience in the fight for transparency and justice.

Thank you for tuning in!